by Shreya Dua

Background and Research Question

The date of the beginning of Archaic Greece remains contested among scholars. It’s culmination, however, coincides with that of the Persian Wars. Broadly speaking, the period lies between 800-480 BCE. It is of little use to concern ourselves with the exact date for the start of the period. The markers of the start of the period were a combination of factors that differentiated it from the preceding period contestably labelled as the ‘Dark Ages’. Somewhere between 800-650 BCE many aspects of Greek society as we imagine them today emerged – the idea of the polis (more as a special entity than a democratic one), literacy and literature, population growth, agricultural surplus, as well as slavery.

David Lewis, in his work, Greek Slave Systems in their Eastern Mediterranean Context c. 800 – 146 BC, has a chapter dedicated to archaic Greek slavery. He agrees with the views of several scholars that contend the use of the term ‘chattel slavery’ for this period. Slaves were most likely acquired from outside the community and their status was not fixed. He goes on to give a detailed analysis of Homer’s Odyssey and Hesiod’s Works and Days. Most of the slave systems of the Classical period find their roots in early archaic Greece – the dependence of elite on slave labour and the use of female slaves in domestic tasks. Little attention has been paid to the latter, except by Thalamann who I engage with in the second half of the study. This essay attempts to fill that very gap by studying the figure of the female slave and understanding their role in that context.

The status of the female slave in early archaic Greece contributed to the economy in terms of labour that was productive, reproductive, and sexual. Their identities and status within the existing power hierarchies were by no means stable or static. In a turn of fate or quirk of war, their lives and well-being could inexorably alter. I argue that this instability arose from their roles as sources, or commodities within the dominant, intertwined economies of exchange: economic, social, and sexual. Not only was the body of a female slave the commodity of exchange and wealth, but it also became the site where male honour was harnessed and perpetuated. This further implies a female slave was not merely a commodity but acquired a gendered identity. In order to analyse this aspect, it becomes imperative to engage with Orlando Patterson’s work on slavery and his theory of ‘social death’. The characteristics that Patterson evolved in conversation with other theorists find resemblance in the status of female slaves during our period of study. Therefore, I begin my analysis by engaging with modern theory surrounding slavery.

Theory

Orlando Patterson defines slavery as “. . . the permanent, violent domination of naturally alienated and generally dishonoured persons” (p.13).

According to Peter Hunt, in order to include several categories that do not find grounding in the word coerced labour, Patterson uses the term domination to include “enhancement of status, sexual exploitation, appeasement of the Gods, or, of course, hard work” (pp. 57-58). Patterson fails to find a distinction between slavery and other forms of oppression. The aspect of Patterson’s definition that is pivotal according to Hunt is his assertion that slaves undergo ‘natal alienation’ rendering them ‘socially dead’. The natal alienation implies deprivation of all that is inherent by birth, manufacturing the lack of social identity. This systemic severance from the social fabric deprives them of the identity and belonging that may have given them rights, and counterbalance the power wielded by their masters. Thus, the lack of legitimate familial and social ties differentiates a slave from other oppressed groups such as serfs (p. 57-58).

Such differentiation draws from ‘natal alienation’ that is analogous to other definitions of slavery with a focus on ‘legal property’. Patterson, as opposed to Davis Lewis’ interpretation of Patterson (referred to below), is talking from the slave’s perspective focusing on the social implications of slavery rather than the legal aspects of property. Since human rights that are universal are only a recent phenomenon, individuals possessed rights based on their membership in a family, clan, village, or community. These were the only safeguards that prevented a person from complete subjugation. When a person lacks these ties, and consequently these rights, they can be treated as property. Thus, for Hunt, while Patterson aligns with traditional definitions of slavery, he also allows for an extensive exploration of comparative history. This perspective accommodates the existence of slaves in societies lacking a robust concept of inalienable property but that encompasses socially dead individuals without recognized rights (p. 59).

David Lewis, primarily contests Patterson on his understanding of ownership. He concludes that ownership is evident through a diverse array of local manifestations, each characterized by its unique nuances, yet interconnected by a shared foundational structure (p. 37). Lewis interprets Patterson’s understanding of property as unique and divergent from the conventional perspective within modern theory; he blurs the distinction between ownership and contractual relationships (p. 43).

According to Lewis, Patterson’s definition itself can be seen taxonomically – “it serves to tell us what slavery is as a category, but it cannot tell us how slavery operates in practice” (p. 48). His four variables – permanence, violent domination, natal alienation, and dishonour – can be leveraged as an analytical strategy to understand the dynamics of slavery across time. This will promote an outlook that searches for the consequences of slave ownership that remain constant across cultural maps, where the slave’s perspective is central to determining the social effects of the ownership. This re-framing that directs attention to the enslaved individual, permits its consideration as a historical phenomenon diachronically across humanity. (Lewis, 2017, p. 48)

Patterson’s updated definition of slavery excluded permanence as one of the characteristics. Permanence was removed from Patterson’s initial definition because of two reasons. First, in the modern context slavery was not an inheritable phenomenon. Second, looking at the ancient world, slavery was a condition that one could be manumitted from. While ‘ownership’ in the legal sense in ancient Greece did not have a termination date and could remain in perpetuity, there were mechanisms through which a slave could shift an owner and in the case of female slaves through child bearing find a semi-slave position with the child being free from the generational curse.

Patterson’s response to Lewis is informed by a critique of Honoré. In order to achieve this, he explains the four ways in which Anglo-American legal thought conceptualised property. The first includes the rudimentary approach of “that which is ruined”. The second is the Lockean-Madisonian definition of property in which domination includes exclusion and not merely in the material sense but also in terms of rights. The third is Blackstone’s definition where the right to exclude is the pivotal factor (p. 267). The fourth is the ‘bundle of sticks’ view employed by Patterson himself. Jane Baron defines this as: “The bundle metaphor also highlights that property involves not just “one man” and his “external things,” but multiple parties tied together in relationships that are social as well as legal. Seen as a bundle of rights, property is not monolithic but is composed of pieces (sometimes called “sticks”) that are combined together but can be disentangled. Property is not about the connection between people and things, but about the connections between and among people” (p. 268).

For Patterson, Honoré belongs as one of the essentialist propagators of the bundle of rights theory. His theory is applicable to only certain pre-capitalist economic systems. Patterson, in contrast, clearly dismisses the supposition that innate qualities and abilities of an individual such as their skills and powers, can be severed from their physical bodies and commodified through contractual agreements and market transactions. This is in addition to the existence of a bundle of rights.

Patterson re-iterates that property was always secondary in his definition. This secondary status was articulated through the array of societies along a spectrum. One extreme expressed power in a personalised manner, and the other in material terms. These two extremes gave rise to complex social dynamics. Those societies, embedded in personal values (such as kinship, early state formations etc.), inadequately differentiated between free and slave. This prevailing approach is akin to the bundle of rights. Integration in a network of claims and rights creates a layer of protection, irrespective of the hierarchy. Thus, a slave is contrasted with a non-slave through the ensured security the latter received through a network of opposing sources of power.

Social Death and Early Archaic Greece

Scholars have often used the Gortyn Code that refers to the marriage between slaves of two different owners (IC IV 72 III 52–IV 8) or between slaves and free persons (IC IV 72 VI 56–VII 10) to suggest that this allowed for the presence of marriage rights among slaves. Linguistic evidence, such as the use of the words ‘opuien’ for male slaves and ‘opuiesthai’ for women that are also applicable to free persons, added to the support of this view (Lewis, 2013, p. 397).

However, a closer examination by Lewis of IC IV 72 III 52–IV 23 reveals that slaves not only had no freedom to choose betrothal but also had no claim over their offspring. The focus of the marriage was unequivocally for the owner’s benefit, granting them authority over the slave’s behaviour in marital life (p.403). This viewpoint is crucial for further analysis.

αἵ δὲ Fοικέα τέκοι κερεύονσα, ἐπελεύσαι τῇ πάστῃ τῷ ἀνδρῷ, ὃς ὀπυίε, ἀντὶ μαρτύρων δύο. αἵ δὲ καὶ με δέξεται, ἐπὶ τῇ πάστῃ ἔμεν τὸ τέκνον τῇ τῆς οἰκίας. αἵ δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ αὖτιν ὀπυίοιτο πρὸ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, τὸ παιδίον ἐπὶ τῇ πάστῃ ἔμεν τῇ τῆς οἰκίας. κορκιοτέρον ἔμεν τὸν ἐπελθόντα καὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας. γυνὴ κερεύουσα, ἢ ἀποβάλοι παιδίον πρὶν ἐπελεύσαι κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα, ἐλεύθερον μὲν καταστήσει πεντήκοντα στατῆρας, δόλοι πέντε καὶ Fίκατι, αἱ καὶ νικᾶθει. οἱ δὲ καὶ με ἴε τὶς τέγα ὀπυί ἐπελεύσει, αὐτὸν μὲ δρέει, αἱ ἢ ἀποθεῖε τὸ παιδίον, ἀπάτων ἔμεν. αἱ κύσαιτο καὶ τέκοι Fοικία μὲ ὀπυιομένα, ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς πάστῃ ἔμεν τὸ τέκνον, αἱ δὲ ὁ πατὴρ μὲ δόοι, ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν ἀδελφῶν πάσταις ἔμεν.

And if a female serf should bear a child while separated, (they) are to bring it to the master of the man who married her in the presence of two witnesses. And if he do not receive it, the child shall be in the power of the master of the female serf; but if she should marry the same man again before the end of the year, the child shall be in the power of the master of the male serf, and the one who brought it and the witnesses shall have preference in the oath. If a woman separated (by divorce) should expose her child before presenting it as is written, if she is convicted, she shall pay, for a free child, fifty staters, for a slave, twenty-five. And if the man should have no house to which she shall bring it or she do not see him, there is to be no penalty if she should expose the child. If a female serf who is unmarried should conceive and bear, the child shall be in the power of the master of her father; but in case the father should not be living, it shall be in the power of the masters of her brothers. (tr. By Willetts, Ronald F.)

According to IC IV 72 III 52–IV 23, if the female slave married a free man, their child would inherit his property, giving the progeny and the woman the scope for upward mobility in society. This aligns with Patterson’s assertion that through sexual relationships with their masters, female slaves, uniquely, could see manumission as a path to becoming ‘secondary wives or concubines’ (p.289). It is interesting that the slave who is generally considered to be property becomes a gendered entity.

The law also highlights the less common occurrence of childbirth outside of wedlock or in separation. The option to expose a child in certain circumstances suggests a bleak agency for the mother, and the use of the term “χηρευω”, meaning bereft or widowed, raises uncertainties about the fate of the offspring when a female slave is left to her own devices.

The mention of a fee paid by the female slave in the same segment suggests access to financial resources. The blame falls on her by default, and she is only exempted if her innocence is proven, indicating a favourable situation for the male owner and re-enforcing the patriarchal framework. The law does not address the scenario if the female slave leaves or dies. It is assumed that the child, in this case, would remain under the male owner’s control.

Thus, the woman slave remains a vassal for the reproduction of labour and security to perpetuate property rights, and in doing so, accelerate the production and reproduction, and keep the lineage intact. How does this, and her transition from mere property to a gendered entity, fit within Patterson’s characteristic of social death?

To answer this question, one has to take into consideration the larger context of reciprocity within early Archaic Greece. As Gerda Lerner explains, dominance over women predates slavery; in fact, it leads to its creation. For her, the unequal division of labour in society structured social relationships in a manner that bestowed rights on men over women but never gave the second sex the same rights. She argues that honour for men is another word for their autonomy. While women do not possess any distinctive claims to honour, men protect their own honour through women. This honour of men was dependent on their political and economic status (Ulf, 2009, pp. 88-89). Thus, women held the capacity to alter the dynamics of this male status and therefore were subject to male control. This leads to two things.

First is their commodification. Men are constantly engaging in an exchange of goods and favours and are usually in debt to one another. The commodities of exchange include “textiles produced by women in the oikos, animals raised on the farm, and metal work and raw materials obtained through trade” (p.88). Such commodities may not always be present for exchange. It is then that women come into play. Thus, commodification is not restricted to slave women; akin to gifts and favours, women become exchangeable.

Second, to preserve the status of men then, women’s status becomes impermanent. Patterson also argues for this impermanence – “it took only the sudden sack of a village or a city to find themselves in the same condition of social death as the slaves who currently served them” (p. 282). The best example of this is found with regard to Andromache, Hector’s wife. In Iliad (6.369-502), Hector reveals his reserve for what would happen to Andromache in the case of his death. There he iterates that she would be made a prize and would lose her freedom. He also mentions the degrading tasks that she would be forced to carry out. This echoes Andromache’s fear for her impending future. Johaannes Kakridas blames Andromache and women in general for trying to hold onto men and preventing them from attaining glory in war. He does not pay any attention to their anxieties, thereby negating their predicament. In order to keep Hector’s κλέος/glory alive, Andromache must push herself into unpredictable circumstances. Hector earns his final act of heroism by dying in the duel with Achilles. Such a death causes a shift in the status of Andromache to a slave and it is her degradation and ‘social death’ that is employed to fuel Achilles’s eternal honour. This epitomises that women’s status as free and respectable is malleable.

The capriciousness between the status of slave and free is encapsulated in the lament put forward by the women. The lament provides a small window for women to express such anxieties. The lament is not a mere groaning but an eloquent putting together of all issues that concern women (p.149). Andromache is weaving her fate, which she then laments upon at the end of Iliad. The same is true of Briseis. In Iliad (19.282-300) Briseis is actually trying to convey, through her lament of Patroclus, that while most men treated her as a transactional object that could change hands to enhance or destroy their own glory, Patroclus was an exception. Within this system of exchange, he would have given her respect and permanency by marrying her to Achilles.

Thus, for women who are already slaves, the situation is even more complex. Linguistically, in Homeric Greek the servile status belongs to women and the masculine terms δοῦλος / δοῦλοι are avoided. Being socially dead, female slaves possess no social ties. This situation changes when they provide sexual and reproductive labour. The aspect of security derived from social relationships (as argued by Patterson) is then acquired by a female slave. Sexual labour may or may not provide this security. However, the creation of a progeny then becomes a pathway to attain security by establishing a familial relationship with the owner. This can be used as a  bargaining chip for slave women/ recently attainted concubinage to solidify her own status. The example of the Gortyn Code analysed above demonstrates this. Moreover, as Thalamann argues, being ‘property’ and ‘socially dead’, slaves are devoid of gender, yet being ‘animate’, they retain certain human characteristics (p.25). Thus, recognising the sexuality of female slaves, in turn recognises their distinctive gender. For Patterson’s characterization of slaves as property was a secondary consideration, and with the recognition of female slaves as gendered entities the aspect of property recedes and a concept similar to the bundle of rights comes into play. Here they can lie at any end of the dynamic spectrum, usually at the lower. Lastly, the dependence for honour and status for men on women extends to female slaves. They can, in essence, lead to the social death of their male owners.

All these aspects are found in one segment of the Odyssey (22.417-474) that alludes to the murder of the twelve maidservants by Telemachus upon Odysseus’ return, who had slept with the suitors. They become the supposedly bad female slaves and are disloyal by sexually engaging with the suitors. By violating the interest of their master, the slaves get labelled as bad. What remains interesting is that this good/bad behaviour is paralleled with what is considered good/bad in terms of gender roles that befit the male and female elites. It is in many ways reflective of this pre-conceived gendered hierarchy. For instance, as Thalamann shows, while the “inside” and “outside” realms are not theoretically applied to slaves, socially and practically the division of labour between male and female slaves only enhances the distinctive division as being an important category of gender roles. Those who slept with the suitors exercised their sexual agency, or so it seems by the words of Eurykleia and Odysseus, and so they inverted the hierarchy of the oikos (household). This is what, in turn, justifies sexuality as being the greatest threat in female slaves.

Emily Wilson, in her seminal translation of the Odyssey, points out the actual lack of agency that these maidservants possessed. The animate element is revealed in the translation by Wilson who refers to the maidservants in the passage as “girls” in Odyssey (22.437), which is the Greek translation for γυναῖκας. This emphasis seems to be missing in earlier translations. The Greek version simply uses the (female) γυναῖκες and (slave girls won in war) δμῳαἰ in (22.423, 424), implying that even they perhaps underwent a shift in status. It is Wilson’s translation that shows their absence of agency by using the words “the suitors made them do with them in secret” (p.492)  for Odyssey (22.444-446).

Further, Lerner remarks upon the failure of Telemachus and Odysseus in protecting the slave women from the suitors, and then sacrificing the women while protecting their own honour which needed to be restored. They are saving their social death that the sexuality of the slave women brings upon them. As Wilson shows, there is a tendency in Odysseus to desperately restore his male lineage and power over the household. Therefore, the guilt bestowed on the maidservants of sexual license with the usurping suitors remains wholly unjustified.

While we may give them animate and even human attributes, they do not have access to the security available through social ties. Penelope, in Homer’s world, does not possess the power or agency to defend them. Her focus is to save herself from the suitors for as long as possible. This makes us think how the androcentric male system places gender categories on slaves in terms of sexuality only where it helps the master to assert his ownership over the slave, thereby essentialising the slave position according to what benefits the master.

Thus, in conclusion, in early Archaic Greece, female slaves were considered as animate and gendered entities providing sexual and reproductive labour. They remained aloof from any societal ties and may or may not have had access to security by being tied down to their status of a slave. Furthermore, their fledgling status was accentuated by their womanhood that underwent commodification (whether or not subject to slavery); though animate, they remained socially dead.

Shreya Dua is currently pursuing a Research Masters at Durham University under the supervision of Edith Hall after completing her MPhil in Greek and/or Roman History from the University of Oxford. Her work focuses on gender and performance in the classical Greek world and her current thesis explores movement patterns in Aeschylus’ chorus’. She is also an Indian classical dancer and a fiction writer, both of which profoundly shape her academic curiosities.

Edited by Rajosmita Roy

Featured image: Achilles Delivers Briseis to Agamemnon’s Heralds, Fondazione Cariplo, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.